Strategy tools as boundary objects by Spee, P. & Jarzabkowski, P.
Spee, P. & Jarzabkowski, P. (2009). Strategy tools as boundary objects. Strategic Organization, 
7(2), pp. 223-232. doi: 10.1177/1476127009102674 
City Research Online
Original citation: Spee, P. & Jarzabkowski, P. (2009). Strategy tools as boundary objects. 
Strategic Organization, 7(2), pp. 223-232. doi: 10.1177/1476127009102674 
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/16787/
 
Copyright & reuse
City University London has developed City Research Online so that its users may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders.  All material in City Research 
Online is checked for eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs 
from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised 
to check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact 
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
  
Published in Strategic Organization. Please cite as: 
Spee, A.P. & P. Jarzabkowski, 2009. ‘Strategy tools as boundary 
objects.’ Strategic Organization. 7.2: 223-232. 
 




Andreas Paul Spee* 
Aston Business School 
Aston University 
Birmingham B4 7ET, UK 
speeap@aston.ac.uk  
Tel: +44 (0) 77 929 70 367 
 
Paula Jarzabkowski 
Aston Business School 
Aston University 
Birmingham B4 7ET, UK 
P.A.Jarzabkowski@aston.ac.uk 
Tel: +44 (0) 121 204 3139 
* Contact author 
 
 
Spee, A.P. & P. Jarzabkowski, 2009. ͚Strategy tools as ďoundary oďjeĐts.͛ Strategic Organization. 7.2: 223-232. 
 1 




The strategy literature has generated an array of strategy „tools‟, such as core competences 
and scenario planning. While these are used extensively in strategy teaching and in strategic 
planning processes, we have few insights on how they are used in practice or of their 
consequences. Our thinking on tools is shaped by the growing strategy-as-practice 
perspective, which views strategy as a type of work that people do, not just a property of 
organizations (Whittington, 2003). Thus, we shift our attention to what actually happens 
when individuals use a strategy tool, rather than simply assuming their usage.  
 
So far, current research has only focused on the intended „textbook‟ purposes of strategy 
tools. We argue that we need to know much more about how these tools are used and for 
what purposes. Focusing upon actual use will offer insights into user‟s intentions and the 
implications of using tools for specific interactions. In particular, different users may employ 
the same tool not only in different ways but for different reasons. Practitioners may thus be 
less concerned about the „proper‟ or „improper‟ use of a strategy tool than with applying it in 
particular situations which appear to be appropriate. However, strategy tool use may also lead 
to unintended consequences. While the language implicit in a particular tool shapes its 
results, such as a report, the report‟s content may not be understood by individuals who are 
unfamiliar with that specific language. Hence, the use of strategy tools may constrain 
effective communication across organizational boundaries.  
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There is a literature on boundary objects, which examines how tools and artifacts span work 
boundaries within organizations (e.g. Bechky, 2003a, b; Carlile, 2002, 2004; Henderson, 
1991; Star and Greisemer, 1989), that has not been incorporated into the strategy literature. 
We aim to build from this literature in order to better understand how strategy tools  enable or 
constrain interaction across intra-organizational boundaries. The boundary objects literature 
is relevant to strategic organization because it helps us to understand a critical issue in the 
strategy process. Strategy processes are prone to interaction boundaries because of the 
hierarchical and distributed nature of organizing strategy tasks (Jarzabkowski, 2005); for 
example between senior and middle managers (Floyd and Lane, 2000; Mantere, 2005) and 
between corporate, divisional and strategic business unit levels (Ketokivi and Castañer, 
2004). A boundary objects framework reveals how and why strategy tools are used in 




Based on existing research on strategy tools, we identified that: tools are not necessarily 
applied instrumentally; and that their use is shaped both by social and political dynamics 
between actors and by a strategy tool‟s design properties. Strategy tools are defined as 
„numerous techniques, tools, methods, models, frameworks, approaches and methodologies 
which are available to support decision making within strategic management‟ (Clark, 1997: 
417). Such frameworks include Porter‟s five forces, core competences and various other 
matrices and models that are typically taught in strategy classes and texts (Mazza and 
Alvarez, 2000). While we do not view strategy tools as strategy itself, they are part of wider 
strategizing activities. For example, despite intense criticism of formal strategic planning 
(Mintzberg, 1994; Schwenk and Schrader, 1993) recent empirical studies provide evidence 
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that it is still widely practiced by organizations and that strategy tools are an inherent part of 
the planning process (e.g. Grant, 2003; Rigby and Bilodeau, 2005).  
 
Much academic debate assumes that strategy tools are used instrumentally for problem-
solving and decision-making (e.g. March, 2006). While there is evidence that tools are indeed 
adopted with problem-solving in mind, empirical findings do not indicate that instrumental 
purposes are the sole, or even the most important reason for using strategy tools. For 
example, the assumption that managers adopt strategy tools to foster corporate performance 
has not yet been validated (Staw and Epstein, 2000). Rather, empirical research indicates that 
strategy tools are adapted according to the particularities of their use. Haspeslagh (1982), for 
example, illustrated that the BCG portfolio matrix was adapted to different sectoral contexts. 
Similarly, tools such as benchmarking were applied for multiple purposes beyond their remit, 
suggesting that strategy tools have sufficient flexibility to be adapted to a wide range of 
strategic tasks (Clark, 1997; Frost, 2003). Other studies have shown that strategy tools, such 
as Balanced Scorecard, may serve conversational rather than analytic purposes (Chesley and 
Wenger, 1999). For example, Hill and Westbrook (1997) found that while SWOT analysis is 
widely adopted in strategy discussions, the results of the analysis do not feed through into 
subsequent strategic decisions. These findings indicate that strategy tools are not necessarily 
used instrumentally to conduct analysis or solve problems.   
 
Strategy tools also serve socio-political purposes. Most studies have addressed the use of 
strategy tools by top managers, finding that they are employed to have strategy discussions, 
for example during workshops (Hodgkinson et al., 2006) and other strategizing activities 
aimed at generating ideas (Hill and Westbrook, 1997). While tools provide a common 
language in which to have a strategy conversation (Barry and Elmes, 1997; van der Heijden, 
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2005), this does not necessarily indicate shared meanings. Rather, Grant (2003) pointed out 
that tools may also hamper shared meaning, particularly across hierarchical levels. He found 
that strategy tools can complicate information sharing, particularly between top and middle 
management, due to the way that they structure and shape information. Furthermore, 
politicized uses are found, as powerful players shape the outcomes that can be designated to 
particular tools in order to legitimate their own interests (Hill and Westbrook, 1997). For 
example, Hodgkinson and Wright (2002) showed that the CEO, due to his power and 
position, had a strong influence on the use of scenario planning tools amongst a senior 
management team and also on which scenarios were regarded as viable. The role of power 
dynamics in using tools to interact within and across levels is thus an important topic for 
future study. In particular, strategy tools appear to „do‟ something in the strategy process, 
enabling or constraining shared strategy language and meanings according to the purposes 
and intentions attributed to them in use (Jarzabkowski, 2005). The socio-political situation in 
which strategy tools are embedded is thus critical both in shaping their use and also in the 
way that they shape strategizing activities. 
 
Design properties are important in the selection and deployment of strategy tools. For 
example, both Clark (1997) and Stenfors et al. (2004) found that users prefer tools which are 
transparent and simple to use, rather than tools based on sophisticated mathematical 
functions. These empirical findings about the preference for simply designed tools that do not 
require specialist knowledge or skills, may be explained by three aspects of use. First, simple 
tools such as the SWOT analysis are considered more flexible, because they can be quickly 
grasped by managers and adapted to a strategy task (Frost, 2003) or conversation (Hill and 
Westbrook, 1997). Second, clearly designed tools such as the BCG matrix are easier to 
remember (Armstrong and Brodie, 1994) and so provide grounds for interaction about 
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strategy tasks (Worren et al., 2002), particularly for managers who do not frequently work 
together, or do not typically use tools. Third, strategists continue to draw upon established 
tools, such as Porter‟s five forces, because these are well known (Argyres and McGahan, 
2000) and have technical, cultural and linguistic legitimacy that makes them easily 
appropriable (Campbell, 1997), even where they are subsequently adapted to the specific 
practices of an organization (Zbaracki, 1998). Strategy tools thus assume the status of an 
artifact; structuring information and providing grounds for interaction around a common tool 
that is easily recognizable by participants in a strategy task (Jarzabkowski and Wilson, 2006). 
  
In summary, existing research substantiates that strategy tools are used in practice but offers 
only limited clues about how they are used. The common theme arising from current research 
is that strategy tools have significant boundary implications; the distributed nature of strategy 
processes across hierarchical, geographical and functional boundaries in the modern firm 
makes tools critical for spanning intra-organizational boundaries. Therefore, we propose the 
concept of boundary objects from the knowing-in-practice literature as a framework for 
explaining how strategy tools are used within the strategy process. From a knowing-in-
practice perspective, tools are not reified objects that provide particular outcomes, but, rather, 
are focal points around which knowing-in-practice arises: „we must see knowledge as a tool 
at the service of knowing not as something that, once possessed, is all that is needed to enable 
action or practice‟ (Cook and Brown, 1999: 388). The boundary objects literature provides 
comprehensive explanations of the role of specific types of artifacts in practice, which may 
be comparable to the role of strategy tools in practice. In particular, this literature focuses 
upon how meanings and actions are attributed to boundary objects in organizational 
interactions, which is informative for the role of strategy tools in strategy interactions.  
 




Boundary objects are artifacts that enable and constrain knowledge sharing across boundaries 
(Bechky, 2003a). There are three knowledge boundaries, syntactic, semantic and pragmatic 
(Carlile, 2002, 2004), which present different degrees of difficulty for sharing knowledge. 
Syntactic boundaries are the simplest, assuming that knowledge can be transferred between 
actors providing that there is a common syntax. In organizational terms, a syntactic boundary 
would be one at which specific contracting arrangements between divisions had been agreed, 
enabling an organization to contract efficiently within its internal supply chain (Sapsed and 
Salter, 2004). A semantic boundary is more complex because common meanings need to be 
developed in order to translate knowledge; for example, between a marketing department and 
a sales division, as they interpret what each other require in order to market and sell a product 
(Levina and Vaast, 2005). Pragmatic boundaries are the most socially and politically 
complex, as common interests need to be developed to transform knowledge at a pragmatic 
boundary (Carlile, 2004). For example, during periods of strategic uncertainty actors within 
different divisions might have different political interests about what constitutes the 
appropriate course of strategic action (Jarzabkowski and Kaplan, 2008). Boundary objects 
assist in the transfer, translation and transformation of knowledge across these syntactic, 
semantic and pragmatic boundaries (Carlile, 2002, 2004).  
 
Not every artifact is a boundary object per se. Artifacts become boundary objects if they are 
meaningfully and usefully incorporated into the practices of actors working in diverse fields 
(Star and Griesemer, 1989). Boundary objects are defined as „flexible epistemic artifacts that 
inhabit several intersecting social worlds and satisfy the information requirements of each of 
them‟ (Star and Griesemer, 1989: 393). Boundary objects also have a common identity across 
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fields. To provide this common identity, artifacts must have a symbolic structure that „is 
common enough to more than one world to make them recognizable‟ (Star and Griesemer, 
1989: 393). Thus, an artifact‟s flexibility is critical in determining how it will be used for 
sense-making by different groups (Henderson, 1991; Sapsed and Salter, 2004).  
 
Levina and Vaast‟s (2005) differentiation between designated boundary objects and boundary 
objects-in-use clarifies some of the social and political dynamics of sharing knowledge across 
boundaries. Designated boundary objects refer to „artifacts that are designated as valuable for 
boundary spanning, due to their design and properties‟ (Levina and Vaast, 2005: 342). 
Typically powerful actors are able to designate an artifact for use. For example, top 
managers, because of their status and position in the planning process, may designate a 
market planning tool as a key artifact to be used (Levina and Vaast, 2005). However, such 
designated boundary objects may or may not become boundary objects-in-use. Boundary 
objects-in-use are artifacts that have meaning and are useful for the work practices of 
different groups of actors, and which acquire a common identity across groups (Star and 
Griesemer, 1989). For example, Bechky (2003b) found that while engineers‟ blueprints of a 
machine were the designated boundary object within a manufacturing plant, prototypes of the 
actual machine became boundary objects-in-use because they had more meaning, and so were 
more useful, for the work being done by technicians and assemblers. How an artifact is used 
thus determines whether it becomes a boundary object-in-use. A boundary object-in-use may 
either be designated or may emerge from the interactions between participants, as they strive 
to share meaning across local contexts. This distinction between the designation and actual 
use of boundary objects illustrates that artifacts do not necessarily have „proper‟ uses in 
practice, but rather that they may served different purposes for different users.  
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Conceptualizing strategy tools as boundary objects  
The boundary objects literature helps to explain why, in practice, strategy tools: i) are not 
necessarily applied instrumentally; ii) may be flexibly interpreted; and iii) are shaped by the 
social and political context of their use. We conceptualize strategy tools as boundary objects 
that may enable or constrain interaction about strategy across intra-organizational boundaries.  
 
Boundary objects, used effectively, enable integration of knowledge across boundaries, 
which explains why strategy tools enable sharing and integration of information about 
strategy within an organization (e.g. Chesley and Wenger, 1999; Grant, 2003). Sharing 
strategic information tends to occur within communicative episodes, such as discussions in 
strategy workshops (Dyson, 2004; Hodgkinson et al., 2006). We can thus understand why, 
after a strategic conversation, the results of the tools may not be absorbed in future strategy 
development (Hill and Westbrook, 1997); their purpose may have been to stimulate 
interaction and enable sufficiently shared meanings to move forward, rather than to provide 
the answer to a problem (Kaplan, 2008). This is particularly likely, given that boundary 
objects are perceived as useful when they are in use (Levina and Vaast, 2005) and, at other 
times may simply serve as a repository for particular aspects of shared knowledge and 
language until they are again brought into use (Star and Griesemer, 1989). Thus, strategy 
tools may be useful for facilitating social interactions between strategy participants. 
However, the analyses performed in a specific interaction may then simply be relegated to a 
report or document that has little relevance to ongoing strategy activities.  
 
This boundary object interpretation of strategy tools extends our understandings about their 
possible rent-earning potential (see Staw and Epstein, 2000) and elaborates the finding that 
strategy tools are not always used instrumentally to attain an analytic output. If one important 
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use of strategy tools is serving as boundary objects that enable social interaction about 
strategy, we need to reevaluate the association between using strategy tools and firm 
performance. The most relevant performance evaluation of a strategy tool as a boundary 
object is in the context of its immediate use and the way that it enables necessary social 
interactions, rather than evaluating specific analytic outputs that advance firm performance. 
Tools that serve as boundary objects may have an indirect impact on firm performance 
because they enable integration of strategic ideas from multiple actors. However, direct 
correlations are not appropriate, indicating avenues for future strategic organization research 
into those performance indicators that may best evaluate the use of strategy tools as boundary 
objects.  
 
The boundary objects literature helps us explain why strategy tools may be used differently in 
different contexts and why simple and flexible tools are valued by practitioners. Flexibility 
permits multiple interpretations (Sapsed and Salter, 2004), as the same tool may be attributed 
different meanings by different groups. Existing research indicates both that strategy tools are 
flexible, as the same strategy tool (e.g. BCG matrix) can have different meanings when 
applied for different purposes, by different individuals or in different contexts and also that 
simple tools (e.g. SWOT) are favored. It appears, as with boundary objects, that a tool must 
be sufficiently well known that multiple actors can recognize and use it, at the same time as 
having sufficient flexibility that multiple actors can attribute different meanings and interests 
to it (Seidl, 2007). The boundary objects literature thus enables us to focus upon the 
interpretative scope and flexibility of a strategy, as well as its legitimacy in the wider 
institutional context (Jarzabkowski, 2004), as a way of understanding how and why such 
tools are used as boundary objects.   
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Boundary objects not only enable interaction but also reveal boundaries within organizations, 
particularly those that are more complex than syntactic boundaries. Boundary objects are not 
always effective at generating shared understandings but may actually highlight the extent to 
which semantic (meaning) and pragmatic (political) boundaries constrain shared meaning and 
action in organizations (Carlile, 2002, 2004). These boundaries explain why strategy tools do 
not always enable strategic integration and, indeed, why strategic planning processes may 
experience communication breakdowns (Beer and Eisenstat, 2000). Semantic boundaries 
explain why the language of a strategy tool and the way that it structures information 
generate obstacles when shifting planning responsibilities from top to middle management 
(Grant, 2003). While the tool may enable shared meanings among one group of actors, top 
managers, it may also create barriers when communicating results to middle managers who 
have not been involved in selecting or using this tool (see Bechky, 2003a, b; Carlile, 2002). 
In particular, the strategic planning process may assign strategic responsibility for the 
selection and use of strategy tools to specific hierarchical levels and functions (Whittington 
and Cailluet, 2008), and so, inadvertently, create semantic boundaries to communicating 
strategy. In order for strategy tools to be effective at spanning semantic boundaries, it is 
important to ensure participation in their selection and use (Mantere and Vaara, 2008). This is 
because the information encoded in a strategy tool, such as a SWOT or BCG matrix, is not 
meaningful in and of itself. Rather, strategy tools derive meaning through the interactions in 
which they are used. 
 
Pragmatic boundaries emphasize that position and status give some actors greater control 
over the selection and use of strategy tools. In particular, the concept of designated boundary 
objects versus boundary objects-in-use indicates that some actors have the power to designate 
a particular tool as a legitimate means for making strategy, and also to influence the outcomes 
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that will be acceptable from the use of that tool (see Hill and Westbrook, 1997; Hodgkinson 
and Wright, 2002). While control over which tools are designated as boundary objects helps 
to define some actors as strategists within an organization (Mantere, 2005), it also constrains 
those tools from becoming boundary objects-in-use. Less powerful actors will not have been 
involved in selecting tools, and the use of those tools may not reflect their interests. Indeed, 
powerful actors may use tools specifically to constrain the array of strategic choices. Such 
use of tools makes them less effective as boundary objects and serves to highlight pragmatic 
boundaries within the strategy process. Indeed, an important factor in applying a strategy tool 
as a boundary object is identifying whether strategic integration is being attempted across 
semantic boundaries, where it is necessary to generate common meanings, or pragmatic 
boundaries, where it is necessary to align different political interests. The association between 
types of boundaries and the particular uses of strategy tools, thus provides a topic for future 
strategic organization research. 
 
Concluding remarks  
In order to serve as a boundary object, a strategy tool needs to have meaning to all strategy 
participants and to bridge their diverse fields of strategy work. The boundary objects concept 
thus enables us to shift our focus to what happens when strategy participants use strategy 
tools to interact across organizational levels. As the actual use of tools, as opposed to their 
textbook explanations, has been largely ignored, future empirical research might frame 
strategy tools conceptually as boundary objects in order to analyze how they are used in 
practice.  
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